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Thurgood Marshall's Dissents In Defense
of the Poor
John T. Hand*
In two landmark cases of the late 1960s, the United States
Supreme Court set an exceptionally positive tone for public assistance as a force capable of integrating poor people with others
in our society. In Goldberg v. Kelly,' Mr. Justice Brennan noted
that society had come to realize that "forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty," and that:
"[w]elfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can
help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities
that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the
3
life of the community."2 Similarly, in Shapiro v. Thompson,
Justice Brennan expressed a view of public assistance that contradicted negative attitudes about the poor that have their roots
in the Elizabethan Poor Laws.4 He wrote that it is just as acceptable for a poor mother to move from one state to another to
seek a better life, including better welfare benefits for herself
and her children, as it is for a person to relocate in order to
obtain better educational opportunities. 5
Underlying Goldberg and Shapiro are the ideas that welfare
benefits are uniquely important entitlements and that people
can receive assistance yet retain their dignity and responsibility
to make independent decisions about how they will live. These
were themes of the civil rights movement and of several feder* Director of Litigation, Westchester Putnam Legal Services; Adjunct Professor,
Poverty Law, Pace University School of Law; Syracuse University School of Law, J.D.,
1967.
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that public assistance may not be terminated without a prior evidentiary hearing at which the recipient may be represented by counsel).
2. Id. at 265.
3. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Durational residence requirements for public assistance constitute an invidious penalty on a person's liberty to travel from one state to another,
since they preclude poor families from obtaining "the very means to subsist." Id. at 627.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 632.
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ally sponsored programs of the late 1960s which sought to empower the poor as well as to feed, clothe and house them. They
are also themes which lie at the heart of Thurgood Marshall's
dissenting opinions in welfare cases.
Over the past two decades, the trend in American welfare
policy has been to make the poor live on less money by standardizing allowances and failing to increase payments in relation
to the cost of subsistence needs. At the same time, governments
have been imposing systems that- closely monitor the poor and
require recipients to obey increasingly stringent eligibility rules.
Against these trends, there are few voices being heard. The poor
are poor in power; they are easy targets for legislative and administrative action based upon racial and class stereotypes and
prejudice.
Justice Marshall was concerned not only about unjustified
reductions in public assistance but also, the ease with which legislatures - and the Supreme Court - rationalized the poverty
of our nation's response to human need. In a number of cases,
Justice Marshall protested the Supreme Court's refusal to come
to the aid of the politically powerless segment of our society.
After the Goldberg and Shapiro decisions, it was shocking
indeed to welfare advocates when the Supreme Court handed
down Dandridge v. Maryland,6 sustaining that state's policy of
discriminating against large families in its public assistance program.' Dandridge devastated the nascent conception that welfare benefits enjoy a constitutional importance greater than the
sale of used rags. Justice Marshall believed that the Court's application of the rational basis test in such circumstances ignored
the importance of welfare benefits and signalled the "emasculation of the Equal Protection Clause as a constitutional principle
applicable to the area of social welfare administration."' Then,
in Lyng v. Castillo,9 he rebuked the majority for condoning food

6. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). If there is "some 'reasonable basis'" for a legislative classification affecting welfare recipients, it must be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 485. Thus, the State of Maryland could implement a system of public assistance
whereby allowances increased depending on the number of children in the family up to a
limit of $250 a month for five children living with a parent.
7. Id. at 486.
8. Id. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9. 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
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stamp legislation that intruded into the privacy of the dining
room and told poor people with whom they must eat in order to
obtain food stamps.10 Here, as in Dandridge, Justice Marshall
would have held that: "when analyzing classifications affecting
the receipt of governmental benefits, a court must consider 'the
character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted
state interests in support of the classification.' ""
Since family structure and survival are not of the same order as a "refusal to let a merchant hawk his wares on a particular street corner,"1 Justice Marshall believed that the federal
statute requiring related household members to file together for
food stamps should be strictly scrutinized and, consequently,
held invalid under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
3 the government's intrusion on family
In Bowen v. Gilliard,'
living arrangements was even more direct and substantial than
in Lyng. Since 1984, Congress has required that children whose
absent fathers support them be included in the public assistance
household and that support payments be paid to the state to
reimburse it for assistance granted to the whole family.14 This
diversion of a child's support income "means that the father is
rendered powerless in most cases to respond to the special financial needs of his child." 5 If, for example, the absent parent
wishes to provide his child with a special diet or music lessons,
such payments would likely be merged into his support obligation and thus paid to the state. Consequently, the impact of this
statutory requirement on the parent-child relationship is

10. Id. at 643-47.
11. Id. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 521 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Justice Marshall previously argued that classifications based on
poverty should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny because poverty is "a suspect
classification which demands exacting judicial scrutiny." James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137, 145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
12. Lyng, 477 U.S. at 644.
13. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
14. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, 1145, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38)
(1988).
15. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 619-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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direct, because a child whose mother needs AFDC"e cannot escape
being required to choose between living with the mother and being supported by the father. It is substantial because the consequence of that choice is damage to a relationship between parent
and child ....

As the record in these cases testifies, a typical fa-

ther will feel strongly that his son should be supported by him
and not by public assistance. The typical mother will feel that
loss of the father's support is a price worth paying to keep the
child with her. The child may well be swept up in a custody dispute over which living arrangement is in its best interest ....

In

short, the Government has sliced deeply into family17 life, pitting
father against mother, with the child in the middle.
In Jefferson v. Hackney,"' the State of Texas paid less
money to poor families with dependent children than it paid to
aged, disabled, and blind people, despite having established an
identical standard of need for each group.1 9 When the Court sustained this discrimination, Justice Marshall disagreed, stating
that Congress intended that similarly situated needy persons
must be treated alike.2" He also pointed out that the disfavored
group -

poor families with minor children -

were 87% black

or Mexican-American. 21 The record contained numerous statements by state officials indicating that poor families with children received lower funding than aged and disabled persons because the program for families was not politically popular.2 2
New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino,2 a upheld New York State's imposition of additional work
requirements that were not specified by Congress in the federal
welfare program for families.2" The danger, Justice Marshall believed, was too great that states would bow to local pressure and
add restrictions not intended by Congress. "Myths abound in
this area. It is widely yet erroneously believed, for example, that

16. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the federally sponsored public assistance program. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
17. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 624 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
19. Id. at 574 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 575-76.
21. Id. at 575.
22. Id.
23. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
24. Id. at 408.
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recipients of public assistance have little desire to become selfsupporting. [citation omitted] Because the recipients of public
assistance generally lack substantial political influence, state legislators may find it expedient to accede to pressures generated
by misconceptions."2 5 Seeking to obviate the possibility that
prejudices would lead state legislators to enact repressive laws
applicable to the federally sponsored welfare program for poor
children and their parents, Justice Marshall wrote that the federal statutes precluded states from adding conditions of eligibility which Congress has not clearly authorized.26
Thus, over Justice Marshall's vigorous dissents, the Supreme Court has sanctioned discriminatory restrictions on eligibility for welfare benefits and governmental intrusiveness into
the lives of the poor. Possibly the most far-reaching intrusion on
personal privacy to find support in the Court's decisions is that
of Wyman v. James,27 which approved warrantless searches of
welfare recipients' homes as a condition of eligibility for assistance.2 8 Justice Marshall did not agree that welfare mothers
should be treated like unruly children:
In deciding that the homes of AFDC recipients are not entitled to protection from warrantless searches by welfare
caseworkers, the Court declines to follow prior case law and employs a rationale that, if applied to the claims of all citizens,
would threaten the vitality of the Fourth Amendment. This Court
has occasionally pushed beyond established constitutional contours to protect the vulnerable and to further basic human values.
I find no little irony in the fact that the burden of today's depar29
ture from principled adjudication is placed upon the lowly poor.
The Court's indifference to the inability of the poor to take
advantage of liberties and privacy accorded to the rest of society
25. Id. at 431-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
26. However, Congress itself has enacted welfare statutes restricting eligibility based
on stereotypes and political prejudices. Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360,
385 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, citing Congress' attempt to disqualify "hippies" from receiving food stamps in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), viewed the disqualification of strikers from eligibility for food
stamps as nothing but the same " 'bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group.' ". Id.
27. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
28. Id. at 326.
29. Id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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was again condemned by Justice Marshall in Beal v. Doe.3" In
that case, the Court ruled that the federal Medical Assistance
program3 1 does not require participating states to include nontherapeutic abortions in their medicaid programs.3 2 Justice Marshall wrote:
I am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of those who preach a
'right to life' that means, under present social policies, a bare existence in utter misery for so many poor women and their children .... If there is any state interest in potential life before the
point of viability, it certainly does not outweigh the deprivation
or serious discouragement of a vital constitutional right of especial importance to poor and minority women.3s
One of the more cynical of the Supreme Court's failures to
accord constitutional protection to the poor is its decision in
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence.34 Homeless
people sought to demonstrate their plight graphically by a
round-the-clock protest, including sleeping, in Lafayette Park
across the street from the White House.3 5 The primary purpose
of including sleeping in the park was " 'to re-enact the central
reality of homelessness.'"36 "By using sleep as an integral part
of their mode of protest, [the homeless] 'can express with their
bodies the poignancy of their plight.' ,37
Yet, the Court upheld the United States Park Service's ban
on sleeping in Lafayette Park as if the protestors were merely
trying to save on a hotel bill. The majority gave short shrift to
the demonstrators' First Amendment rights by applying minimal scrutiny to the Park Service's regulations since they fell
under the rubric of time, place and manner regulation rather
than content regulations. 8 Justice Marshall realized that a content-neutral regulation is fully capable of unnecessarily dimin-

30. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988).

32. Beal, 452 U.S. at 447.
33. Id. at 456-57, 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

34. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
35. Id. at
36. Id. at
37. Id. at
601 (D.C. Cir.
38. Id. at

289.
303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Respondents).
306 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586,
1983)).
298.
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ishing First Amendment freedom of expression:
A content-neutral regulation that restricts an inexpensive mode
of communication will fall most heavily upon relatively poor
speakers and the points of view that such speakers typically espouse. [citation omitted] This sort of latent inequality is very
much in evidence in this case for respondents lack the financial
means necessary to buy access to more conventional modes of
persuasion.
A disquieting feature about the disposition of this case is that
it lends credence to the charge that judicial administration of the
First Amendment, in conjunction with a social order marked by
large disparities in wealth and other sources of power, tends systematically to discriminate against efforts by the relatively disadvantaged to convey their political ideas. 9
Justice Marshall's dissents deplore not only the Supreme
Court's standard for constitutional adjudication in the area of
welfare legislation but also its frequent reliance upon unjustified
premises about how the poor live and act. United States v.
Kras'4 raised an important issue concerning the due process
rights of the poor to have access to the judicial system, i.e., the
validity of requiring an indigent person to pay a fee for filing a
petition in bankruptcy. Justice Marshall castigated the majority
which believed that $1.28 a week is pin money that no one would
miss: "[b]ut no one who has had close contact with poor people
can fail to understand how close to the margin of survival many
of them are. It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about
what the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded
assumptions about how people live."4' 1
Today, the poor face a future that is bleak both as to their
material needs and their constitutional rights. Like the Peverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall had
"the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have three
meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their
minds, and dignity, equality, and freedom for their spirits."' 2
39. Id. at 313-14 n.14.
40. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
41. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE WORDS
Scott King ed. 1983).

OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

25 (Coretta
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Sadly, Justice Marshall and most of the other great leaders of
the civil rights movement are now gone. Though the times may
not seem auspicious for a revival of the spirit of those days, we
are very much in need of the passion of that movement.
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